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BANKS, BONDS AND RISK: THE MYCAL
BANKRUPTCY AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
FOR THE JAPANESE BOND MARKET*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The recent bankruptcy of Japan’s retail giant Mycal has brought
great focus on numerous weaknesses in Japan’s financial system.  The
assessment by Japanese banks of the amounts and classifications of
bad debt on their books has been substantially underestimated.1  As a
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miko Yokoo for their assistance in source substantiation, Hideyuki Sakai for his time, kindness
and insight, and is particularly indebted to Professor Hideaki Otsuka of Waseda University,
without whose advice and encouragement this note would never have been written.
1. In a recent visit to Tokyo, Kenneth Dam, the U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary, said that
Japan’s bad debt problem (the amount of non-performing loans carried by Japanese banks),
measured as a percentage of gross domestic product, could be four to six times as large as the
U.S. savings and loan industry’s insolvency crisis of the late 1980s.  See James Brooke, U.S.
Urges Japan To Act Quickly On Bad Loans, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 2001, at 1.  Al-
though the problem is getting worse, it is hardly new; articles from the first half of the 1990s
read as if they were written a week ago, only the names and dates change.  The bad loan burden
was estimated to be as high as ¥80 trillion ($667 billion) in 1995, and even the Ministry of Fi-
nance admitted it was probably at least as high as ¥40 trillion ($333 billion).  Japanese Banking:
Less Dishonest, ECONOMIST, June 10, 1995, at 68, 68; see Japan’s Monetary Implosion,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1992, at 75, 75–76 (estimating non-performing loan burden on Japanese
banks as high as ¥60 trillion ($500 billion) and predicting that Japanese banks’ reluctance to sus-
tain losses would prevent them from writing off their domestic bad debts for years, perhaps even
for a decade).
The origin of many of these bad loans lies in the collapse of property values that occurred
in the wake of the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy in the early 1990s.  See generally
CHRISTOPHER WOOD, THE BUBBLE ECONOMY: JAPAN’S EXTRAORDINARY SPECULATIVE
BOOM OF THE ‘80S AND THE DRAMATIC BUST OF THE ‘90S 1–78 (1992).  Wood predicts a
banking crisis caused by an avalanche of bad debts, most of them property related.  Id. at 14.
The bad loan crisis is complex, and Wood’s book expertly explains its numerous causes as well
as the origins and consequences of the bubble itself.  Dependent upon property as collateral
supporting the credit they extended during the speculative frenzy of the bubble, Japanese banks
and non-banks (leasing companies, real estate or consumer finance companies, etc.) found
themselves saddled with huge non-performing loan loads as a result.  But the banks were unable
to begin writing off loans, for that would entail selling the real property collateral supporting the
loans at depressed prices, which would further pull down land values and create more non-
performing loans.  Banks therefore chose instead to wait for prices to recover; they never have,
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result, the true financial status of some of the largest borrowers from
Japan’s banks has been obscured, and companies that are either tee-
tering on the edge of bankruptcy or that should have been pushed
over the edge long ago are still being propped up.2  This unwillingness
by banks to let their worst debtors fail exacerbates the shock on Ja-
pan’s financial markets when large companies like Mycal finally do
collapse.  In particular, Mycal’s bankruptcy has damaged confidence
in Japan’s corporate debt market.  Many investors feel they are being
misled about the true financial status of companies that issue debt,
and that corporate bond trustees and banks are not protecting their
interests.3  Over 20,000 individual investors will only recover a frac-
tion of the face value of their Mycal bonds, which were rated invest-
ment grade just months before the retailer filed for court protection.4
The Mycal bankruptcy has become a symbol of the problem, if
not the most prominent event in Japan that has brought attention to
and with the value of the stock market collapsing as well, the bad loan problem only continues
to worsten.  See Japanese Banks: Bad-debt Troubles, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1991, at 97, 97–98
(describing the dependence of Japan’s banks on property as collateral for loans, why that caused
banks not to take steps to reduce their bad debts, and how non-banks were used as channels for
investment in real estate during the bubble economy in order to circumvent more stringent re-
strictions preventing such investment by the banks themselves); Japan’s Non-banks: What a
Mess, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 96, 98 (explaining the extent of the non-bank bad debt
problem and its huge impact on the banks that back them); WOOD, supra, at 38–44 (detailing
the extent of the non-bank problem, and the lack of action taken by Japanese banks against
their bad debts).
2. Dead, or just resting?, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2001, at 70, 70.  Few of the big, economi-
cally battered borrowers from Japanese banks have been classified as either bankrupt or in dan-
ger of bankruptcy (the serious “bad debt” categories), and have instead been classified as y u
ch ui saki, or “in need of monitoring.”  Under official guidelines, Japanese banks currently
carry about ¥13 trillion ($108 billion) of bad debt, but when weak borrowers that have been
grouped in the “in need of monitoring” category are also included, the bad debt burden weigh-
ing on Japan’s banks is as high ¥150 trillion ($1.25 trillion).  Id.  One of the reasons for the un-
derestimation of the bad debt problem is the difference in reserves that Japanese banks must set
aside for the two different categories of loans: seventy percent of the value of the loan for loans
“in danger of bankruptcy,” as opposed to only five percent for loans “in need of monitoring.”
Id.  Reclassifying these weak borrowers could push the capital ratios of many Japanese banks
below the eight percent minimum required by the Bank for International Settlements.  See
Banks precariously close to sinking into red, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 15, 2001, at 1; Banks’ bad-loan
bumbling, supra note 1, at 19.  Mycal was classified as “in need of monitoring” by Dai-Ichi Kan-
gyo Bank, its main lender, until the day it filed for bankruptcy.
3. See Atsushi Suemura, Deforuto De Rotei Shita Shasai Shijy  No Mijyukusa [The Im-
maturity of the Japanese Corporate Debt Market Exposed by Default], 53 KIGY  KAIKEI 82, 82
(2001); Natsumi Tsukamoto, Mycal failure blindsides bond market, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 8, 2001,
at 12.
4. In mid-September it was estimated that these investors would suffer an average loss of
¥4 million (over $33,000) each.  Yoichi Takita, Drastic steps needed now in cleanup of bad loans,
NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 24, 2001, at 7.
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it.  This note will focus primarily on the Mycal bankruptcy in the con-
text of the Japanese corporate debt market, and on why the impact of
the retailer’s failure was as extensive as it was.  Part II summarizes the
factual background of the Mycal bankruptcy.  Part III details the
bankruptcy’s impact on Mycal’s bondholders, as well as its overall ef-
fect on the Japanese corporate bond market.  Part IV focuses on the
dramatic changes that have taken place in the Japanese corporate
bond market since World War II, on its early 1990s reform, and on
why Mycal’s impact ten years later was so dramatic.  Part V concludes
with some general observations about Mycal, the corporate bond
market, and Japan’s economic crisis in general.
II.  THE MYCAL BANKRUPTCY: FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. General
On September 14, 2001, Mycal, Japan’s fourth largest retailer
and supermarket giant, shocked the country by announcing that it
was filing for bankruptcy under the Civil Rehabilitation Law (Minji
Saiseih ).5  The immediate reason for Mycal declaring bankruptcy
was that it was unable to come up with the ¥40 billion ($333 million)
needed to pay creditors by a September 17 deadline.6  Mycal’s stock
price had been steadily plunging, which made it difficult to borrow
additional funds, even from its main lender, the Dai-Ichi Kangyo
Bank (DKB).7  At the time Mycal filed for bankruptcy, it owed DKB
5. Maikaru H teki Seiri He, Fusai 1 Ch En Ch , Shu Ryoku K  Shien Uchikiri [Mycal
Declares Bankruptcy, Main Bank Cuts off Support], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 14, 2001
(evening ed.), at 1 (providing a brief history of Mycal).  Four retailers merged in 1963 to form
Mycal; by the time it had filed for reorganization, Mycal had 15,900 full-time employees and
36,500 part-time employees.  Id.; Maikaru Saiseih  Shinsei, Fusai 1 Ch 7400 Oku En [Mycal
Files for Civil Rehabilitation, 1.74 Trillion Yen in Bad Debt], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 15,
2001, at 1 [hereinafter Mycal Files for Cvil Rehabilitation]; see also Minji saiseih [Civil rehabili-
tation law], Law No. 225 of 1999.
6. Saiken Shud ken, Gink  to Ant  [Hidden Fight with Bank over Restructuring Leader-
ship], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 15, 2001, at 3 [hereinafter Hidden Fight with Bank].
7. Mycal goes belly-up after banks refuse to extend further support, NIKKEI WKLY., Sept.
17, 2001, at 1, 21 [hereinafter Mycal goes belly-up].  On September 12, 2001, the company’s
stock price sank as low ¥62 ($0.52) per share.  Id.; see infra note 50 for source with Mycal stock
price and credit rating graph.  For a description of the Japanese main bank system, which refers
to a system of corporate financing and governance in which the main bank is a borrower’s pri-
mary lender, a principal shareholder, and assumes a vital monitoring and, if necessary, restruc-
turing role towards the borrower, see generally THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS
RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh
Patrick eds., 1994); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring in Japan, 11
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399 (1989).
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¥162 billion (nearly $1.35 billion) in outstanding loans, almost exactly
double DKB’s exposure to Mycal in late February 2001.8  Mycal’s
outstanding loans to the entire Mizuho Financial Group (DKB, Fuji
Bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan, and Yasuda Trust) totaled ¥316
billion (over $2.6 billion), ¥150 billion of which was not covered by ei-
ther collateral or loss reserves.9  In the days before Mycal collapsed,
smaller lenders realized how precarious the retailer’s position was
and began calling in their loans.  DKB was forced to either pay them
off or lose its entire investment in the supermarket giant.10  In all, My-
cal was in debt to the tune of ¥1.74 trillion ($14.5 billion), an amount
slightly greater than its consolidated sales for the entire fiscal year
2000 ended February, 2001 (¥1.72 trillion, $14.3 billion), and making
it Japan’s fifth largest post-war bankruptcy.11
8. Dokyumento, Maikaru Hatan #2: Gink , Ky ch  Ni Genkai [Mycal Bankruptcy Feature
#2: Limits to Bank Cooperation], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 16, 2001, at 3.  In the seven-
month period between February and September, 2001, DKB loaned an additional ¥83.6 billion
($697 million) to Mycal.  Id.
9. Dokyumento, Maikaru Hatan #2: Gink , Ky ch  Ni Genkai [Mycal Bankruptcy Feature
#2: Limits to Bank Cooperation], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 16, 2001, at 3; Mizuho, Saish
Akaji No K san [Mizuho, Final Projections in the Red], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 15,
2001, at 4.
10. Mycal’s decision to cave in displeases main lender, NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 24, 2001, at 13.
Between the end of December 2000 and the end of August 2001, The Mizuho Financial Group’s
outstanding loans to Mycal increased from just under ¥200 billion ($1.67 billion) to over ¥300
billion ($2.5 billion), while loans to Mycal from other financial institutions dropped over ¥125
billion to under ¥240 billion ($2 billion).  Dokyumento, Maikaru Hatan #2: Gink , Ky ch  Ni
Genkai [Mycal Bankruptcy Feature #2: Limits to Bank Cooperation], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,
Sept. 16, 2001, at 3.  In February 2001, Sanwa Bank, Norin Ch kin Bank, Shinsei Bank, and Su-
mitomo Trust Bank all turned down DKB’s requests for their participation in a syndicate loan
to keep Mycal afloat.  Id.  In August 2001, DKB extended ¥50 billion ($417 million) in addi-
tional loans to Mycal in a last-ditch effort to keep the retailer alive while it discussed tying up
with American retail giant Wal-Mart.  Id.
For a helpful discussion of loan syndication in the Japanese main bank system and how it
has evolved since World War II, see Toshihiro Horiuchi, The Effect of Firm Status on Banking
Relationships and Loan Syndication, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 258, 275–87 (Ma-
sahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).  Since 1985, bank syndication in Japan has taken the
form of an “implicit” or “de facto” syndication, with no formal syndicate, manager bank, or fee
structure, while still maintaining a hierarchical ranking headed by the main bank in a monitor-
ing role that induces other lenders to participate.  Id. at 285.  Just how weak Japanese main
banks have become is strikingly demonstrated by DKB’s inability to effectuate the February
syndicate loan, as well as in the dispersal of monitoring and information gathering functions to
the smaller banks that refused to participate.
11. Mycal goes belly-up, supra note 7, at 1.  The two largest of the top five Japanese bank-
ruptcies were life insurance companies Kyoei Seimei Hoken (total debt ¥4.53 trillion, or $37.75
billion) and Chiyoda Seimei Hoken (¥2.94 trillion, or $24.5 billion), both of which went under in
October, 2000.  Hidden Fight with Bank, supra note 6, at 3.  The fourth largest bankruptcy was
another retailer, Sogo Group, which collapsed in July 2000, holding over ¥1.87 trillion ($15.6
billion) of debt.  Id.
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B. Mycal’s Expansion and Decline
Mycal expanded and diversified enormously through Japan’s in-
famous asset-inflated bubble economy of the late 1980s, adding fit-
ness centers and movie theater complexes to the operation of 215
stores across Japan.12  These large investments resulted in spiraling in-
terest-bearing debt, however, and with the bursting of Japan’s eco-
nomic bubble, the collapse of share prices and real estate values, and
Japan’s extended economic downturn throughout the 1990s, Mycal’s
excessive levels of facilities and debt became a heavy burden.13  Be-
tween 1991 and 2000, Mycal’s floor space in its oversized stores in-
creased by sixty-one percent, but its total sales increased by only two
percent, reflecting a huge decline in efficiency.14  In January 2001,
Mycal announced a three-year restructuring plan that included clos-
ing fifty unprofitable stores and eliminating 2,700 jobs, and in Febru-
ary it promised to trim its interest-bearing debt from ¥1.15 trillion
($9.58 billion) to ¥910 billion ($7.58 billion) by the end of August
2001.15  The beginning of the end came when Mycal was unable to se-
curitize property and raise ¥120 billion ($1 billion) as a result of a
downgrade of the company’s bond rating in June, 2001.16  Mycal was
12. Mycal goes belly-up, supra note 7, at 1.  Mycal’s short-lived president, Kozo Yamashita,
also wrote an interesting article on how the company’s expansion reflected the philosophy of its
then-president, Toshio Kobayashi, and how this expansionary policy was responsible for My-
cal’s demise.  See Kozo Yamashita, Zaii Nish kan, Yarubeki Koto Ha Yatta [During My Two
Week Tenure, I Did All I Should Have], NIKKEI BUS., Oct. 15, 2001, at 139–42.  Yamashita also
criticizes past management’s practice of keeping unprofitable stores open (so long as other
profitable stores balanced out the losses) as a way of giving back to the community, as well as
the decision to diversify into areas in which Mycal had little experience, such as the retail of
sporting goods and electronics and the operation of hotels, in relation to the construction of
“Mycal town” malls.  Id.  Such unrelated diversification strategies have frequently been criti-
cized.  See, e.g., W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 273 (1991) (“[M]any of the new businesses being pursued have only the
loosest of connections with the investing firm’s organizational capabilities.”); Michael Bradley
et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation
in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
9, 65 (1999) (The system of corporate cross-shareholding in Japan “may lead managers to un-
dertake excessive investments in capacity and may create the tendency for . . . uneconomical
diversification.”).
13. Mycal goes belly-up, supra note 7, at 1; Investors with Mycal bonds worried about re-
covery ratio, NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 24, 2001, at 14.
14. Tachisukumu Kigy , #4: Maikaru Fujy  Ni Ashikase [Petrified Business, Part 4: Obsta-
cle to Mycal’s Rise], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 24, 2001, at 1.  The Japanese retail industry
suffers from serious over-capacity; as much as thirty percent of the total number of large-scale
retail outlets in Japan are excess facilities and unneeded.  Id.
15. Mycal goes belly-up, supra note 7, at 21.
16. Id.
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forced to announce in late August that it had no choice but to delay
its debt-reduction plan, and confidence and its financial support
quickly evaporated.17
C. Structuring Bankruptcy and Changing Leadership
On the same day Mycal filed for bankruptcy, it announced that it
had voted to dismiss its president, Osamu Shikata, and to replace him
with a director, Kozo Yamashita, who favored filing for protection
under the new Civil Rehabilitation Law.18  It soon become apparent,
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1; Mycal Files for Cvil Rehabilitation, supra note 5, at 1.
Japan has five types of insolvency proceedings.  Three of these proceedings are procedures
for reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor.  The Corporate Reorganization Law [Kaisha
k seih ], Law No. 172 of 1952, is a separate law categorized under Japan’s Code of Civil Proce-
dure [Minji VRVK K ] and modeled on Chapter X of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  See Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 10, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).  Company Arrangement [Kaisha seiri],
Law No. 72 of 1938, is a corporate work-out procedure under Articles 381–403 of the Commer-
cial Code [Sh h ].  SH H , arts. 381–403.  Finally, the Civil Rehabilitation Law, Law No. 225 of
1999, also categorized under the Code of Civil Procedure, replaced the Composition Law Pro-
ceedings [:DJLK ], Law No. 72 of 1922 (repealed 2000), in April 2000, and is intended for small-
to medium-sized debtors.  In practice, the Corporate Reorganization Law and the Civil Reha-
bilitation Law are the most common reorganization proceedings, and Company Arrangement is
seldom used.
There are also two terminal proceedings that end in the liquidation and dissolution of the
debtor (for legal entities).  These are Special Liquidation [Tokubetsu seisan] and the Bank-
ruptcy Law [Hasanh ].  Special Liquidation is a procedure provided in Articles 431–456 of the
Commercial Code and used to dissolve companies that have an excess of debts over assets and
therefore cannot complete a normal dissolution.  Tokubetsu seisan [Special liquidation law],
Law No. 72 of 1938; SH H , arts. 431–56.  The Bankruptcy Law is categorized under the Code
of Civil Procedure and is the proceeding of last resort for debtors, whether as an original pro-
ceeding or as a clean up for the failure of a corporate reorganization, company arrangement,
civil rehabilitation or special liquidation.  Hasanh  [Bankruptcy law], Law No. 71 of 1922.  It
may be utilized by any entity, including individuals.  See Hideyuki Sakai & C. Christian Jacob-
son, Japan, in 2 COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INSOLVENCY GUIDE § 29.08(2)(a) (Rich-
ard F. Broude et al. eds., 2001).
A surprising number of Japanese reorganizations, however, take place outside of the legal
system, thanks to the role of main banks in assisting borrowers in times of financial crisis, and
because of the heavy involvement of Japanese organized crime in bankruptcy and debt collec-
tion.  See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institu-
tional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 54–55, 66–69 (2000).
Among other categories of gangsters, seiriya (fixers), toritateya (debt collectors), and yonigeya
(one who helps another flee in the night) play extensive roles on behalf of both debtors and
creditors in insolvencies.  Id. at 67–68.  Japan’s scarcity of lawyers has led to the development of
numerous organized crime-related specialists, who view themselves as urashakai no bengoshi, or
“lawyers for the dark side of society.”  Id. at 69.  On the pivotal role of Japanese main banks in
restructuring troubled borrowers, see generally Paul Sheard, Main Banks and the Governance of
Financial Distress, in THE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 188 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds.,
1994); Sheard, supra note 7, at 407–11.  “[T]ogether with the system of stable interlocking
shareholdings, . . . the main bank performs a role that closely parallels in its effect the external
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though, that the change in leadership was not simply a symbolic ges-
ture of assumption of responsibility, but rather reflected deep divi-
sions between Mycal’s management and its main lender, DKB, as to
how to resurrect the moribund company.  DKB wanted Mycal to file
under the Corporate Reorganization Law (Kaisha K seih ) in ex-
change for the bank’s support through the reorganization proceed-
ings.19  Former president Shikata was willing to follow DKB’s wishes,
and the plan was for DKB to provide temporary financing to Mycal
after it filed for bankruptcy in order to keep its stores open, to facili-
tate a takeover by another Japanese retailer, and to avoid negative ef-
fects on its trade creditors.20  But Mycal’s Board of Directors threw a
wrench into the works by instead dismissing Shikata as president, se-
lecting Yamashita to replace him, and filing under the Civil Rehabili-
tation Law at his suggestion.21
Whereas the Civil Rehabilitation Law allows a debtor’s man-
agement team to remain in place,22 it is customary practice in Japan
takeover market: in particular in bringing about the displacement of ineffectual management
and the reorganization of corporate assets to improve efficiency.”  Id. at 409.
19. Hidden Fight With Bank, supra note 6, at 3.  DKB reportedly wanted Mycal to file un-
der the Corporate Reorganization Law because the law allows debt that is held by creditors to
be reduced at the same percentage across the board, thereby easing the loss incurred by the
main bank in comparison to other creditors.  Id.  It is more likely, however, that Corporate Re-
organization proceedings will be less advantageous for DKB, Mycal’s largest secured creditor,
because they prohibit the foreclosure of any liens once a protective order has been given, like
the effect of an automatic stay under U.S. Bankruptcy Code Section 362.  11 U.S.C. § 362
(2000); see Kaisha k seih  [Corporate reorganization law], Law No. 172 of 1952, arts. 39, 123,
124.  The Corporate Reorganization Law has no provision comparable to the right [betsujy ken]
given secured creditors under either the Civil Rehabilitation Law, art. 53, or the Bankruptcy
Law, arts. 92–97, to foreclose their liens.  DKB’s reasoning behind its insistence on the use of
the Corporate Reorganization Law, therefore, is somewhat of a mystery and may perhaps have
been more motivated by politics than economics.  Interview with Hideyuki Sakai, Founding
Partner of The Law Offices of Hideyuki Sakai, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 14, 2001) (suggesting that
the lawyer closest to Shikata was more experienced with the Corporate Reorganization law).
20. Hidden Fight With Bank, supra note 6, at 3; see also Yamashita, supra note 12, at 142
(claiming that Shikata was prepared to file under the Corporate Reorganization law as a pre-
condition to support from rival Japanese retailer Aeon).  Because over a third of Mycal’s stores
were in direct competition with Aeon’s, however, this strategy would entail closures and layoffs.
Id.  Yamashita, on the other hand, had been involved in takeover negotiations with Wal-Mart
since March 2001, and because the foreign retailer had no foothold in Japan, he assumed it
would be more likely to take Mycal over without painful restructuring.  This was probably an
over-optimistic assessment of Wal-Mart’s intentions.
21. Hidden Fight With Bank, supra note 6, at 3.
22. Minji saiseih  [Civil rehabilitation law], Law No. 225 of 1999, art. 38, para. 1 (“The
debtor has the right to carry on his duties, manage finances, and dispose of assets even after the
beginning of Civil Rehabilitation proceedings.”).  Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Civil Rehabili-
tation Law approximates the rights, powers, and duties of a debtor in possession under Chapter
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000).
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for a company’s management to resign upon filing under the Corpo-
rate Reorganization Law.23  Mr. Shikata would later say that his re-
placement was a “coup d’état by part of current management to main-
tain control after bankruptcy.”24  The dramatic boardroom fireworks,
however, reflected not just a power struggle, but a deepening trend in
Japanese finance and a deep divide between new President Yama-
shita and DKB.  Yamashita had been instrumental in trying to dis-
tance Mycal from DKB’s control in the years leading up to the bank-
ruptcy; since 1996, Mycal raised over ¥260 billion ($2.17 billion)
through twenty-seven different domestic corporate bond issuances.25
The coup, however, did not last long.  Yamashita resigned as
president on September 28, and was replaced by Kazuo Urano, an-
other of Mycal’s directors, in order to repair relations with Mycal’s
banks (in particular DKB) and trading partners.26  By filing under the
Civil Rehabilitation Law, Yamashita had quickly sought to restruc-
ture Mycal without the help of its main bank, but two weeks later,
unable to secure any substantial financing, he instead found himself
isolated, having burned Mycal’s bridges.  Without the backing of a
main bank, so important to most Japanese businesses, many trade
23. Hidden Fight With Bank, supra note 6, at 3.  Although nothing in Japan’s Corporate
Reorganization law requires management’s resignation, the trustee [kanzainin] is automatically
appointed and takes over all rights regarding the management of the company and the disposi-
tion of its assets, see Kaisha k seih  [Corporate reorganization law], Law No. 172 of 1952, art.
53, effectively emasculating management, so they typically resign anyway.
24. Hidden Fight With Bank, supra note 6, at 3.
25. Mycal’s decision to cave in displeases main lender, supra note 10, at 13; Yameru Kinyu
#3: Chijimu Gink  [Sickly Finances, Part 3: Shrinking Banks], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept.
18, 2001, at 7 (“Although the financial strategy of Japanese businesses is leaning increasingly
towards the capital markets and away from bank financing, struggling companies that are having
trouble obtaining financing on the capital markets find themselves still beholden to their main
lenders.”).  This quote from the article accurately depicts Mycal’s situation.  The picture is,
however, more complicated.  The trustee [shasai kanri gaisha] for Mycal’s corporate bonds was
DKB, which raises questions concerning conflict of interests.  See Suemura, supra note 3, at 82;
see also infra Part IV.C.
26. Konran Tsuzuku Maikaru Saiken [Mycal Restructuring: The Confusion Continues],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 5, 2001, at 3 (providing a graphic that details change in Mycal
presidents from the time of bankruptcy filing, as well as the change in the company’s financial
advisors from Daiwa Shoken SMBC to Nikko Salomon Smith Barney.  By September 27, Daiwa
Shoken SMBC was only able to secure a single loan of ¥10 billion from one of its own overseas
affiliated companies.); Maikaru: Shien Kigy  Sagashi Nank , Yamashita 6KDFK  Jinin Happy
[Mycal, Trouble Finding a Supporting Business, President Yamashita Announces Resignation],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 28, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Mycal, President Yamashita An-
nounces Resignation]; Maikaru Yamashita Shach , Jinin M shide [Mycal’s President Yamashita
Tenders Resignation], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 28, 2001, at 11; see also Yamashita, supra
note 12, at 142 (explaining Yamashita’s reasons for resigning so as to repair relations with DKB
and restore transparency to the procedures for selecting a sponsor for Mycal).
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creditors refused to continue supplying Mycal with the products it
desperately needed to keep its shelves stocked.27  Mr. Yamashita’s
brief tenure as president, therefore, met with unease from the start.
Onlookers even expressed concern about moral hazard, in particular
the possibility that current management was obscuring its responsi-
bility by filing under the Civil Rehabilitation Law; so long as Mr. Ya-
mashita was president, no creditors trusted Mycal.28
Interestingly, Mycal’s counsel in the Civil Rehabilitation pro-
ceedings, Takashi Ejiri, announced his resignation as the company’s
representative on the same day as President Yamashita.29  Ejiri had
been intimately involved with Yamashita and Mycal on past occa-
sions, including efforts to diversify Mycal’s sources of financing away
from bank loans via the issuance of corporate bonds, as well as My-
cal’s pre-bankruptcy tie-up negotiations with Wal-Mart.30  Ejiri’s in-
volvement in the company’s restructuring provoked both creditors
27. Shikin Kuri Sadamarazu: Tana Ni Ha Keppin, Uriage Gen [Can’t Find Financing:
Empty Shelves, Sales Down], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 13 (suggesting that repairing
relations with its main financial backers appeared to be the only way Mycal could maintain rela-
tions with suppliers).  Wholesalers independently have devised their own systems for rating the
credit-worthiness of retailer customers like Mycal, taking into account factors such as capital
ratios and product turnover.  Dokyumento: Maikaru Hatan #5, Tsuyomaru Shijy  No Atsuryoku
[Mycal Bankruptcy Feature, Part 5: Strengthening Market Pressure], NIHON KEIZAI SHINMBUN,
Sept. 20, 2001, at 5.  Large suppliers such as Itochu Shokuhin and Kato Sangyo had already de-
manded payment three times per month from Mycal beginning in June, 2001.  Id.; see also Mai-
karu, Torihiki Keizoku Wo Y sei: N ny  No Miawase No Ugoki Mo [Mycal Requests Trading
Partners Maintain Relations: Some Withholding Supplies], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 16,
2001, at 7; Maikaru Torihiki Saki Tai  Isogu: N hin Teishi Ya Genkin Kessai [Mycal Responds
Quickly to Trading Partners: Supplies Halted and Cash Required for Transactions], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 15, 2001, at 9; Shiharai Jy ken Wo Kenen: Maikaru Saikensha Setsumei-
kai [Concerned About The Conditions of Payment: Mycal Creditors Meeting], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Sept. 18, 2001, at 13.
Although many experts have observed that the reliance on bank financing has decreased
markedly in Japan, this scholarship is mostly from the late 1980s or early 1990s, at the zenith of
the bubble economy.  It is highly likely that Japan’s prolonged economic woes have led many
companies desperate for cash to restore main bank relations.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J.
Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Indus-
trial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 880 n.38 (1993).
28. Maikaru 6KDFK  Jinin, Tsunagi Y shi Hikikae Ni [Mycal’s President Resigns in Ex-
change for Financing], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (evening ed.), Sept. 28, 2001, at 3; see also In-
terview with Hideyuki Sakai, Founding Partner of The Law Offices of Hideyuki Sakai, in To-
kyo, Japan (Dec. 14, 2001) (explaining that the source of the moral hazard concern was that if
indeed a foreign retailer such as Wal-Mart took over Mycal, it would have no local resources of
its own and would be more likely to keep current management.  Yamashita had been heavily
involved in the negotiations with Wal-Mart since early 2001.).
29. Mycal, President Yamashita Announces Resignation, supra note 26, at 1.
30. Maikaru Urano Taisei He Ik  [Mycal, Switching to Urano’s Leadership], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Sept. 29, 2001, at 9.
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and even fellow lawyers on Mycal’s bankruptcy representation team
to protest about a possible conflict of interest, and his resignation was
just as crucial for restoring confidence in Mycal’s management as Mr.
Yamashita’s.31
D. The Search for a Sponsor
With President Urano now at the helm, Mycal and its lawyers
began the process of finding another business to take over the failed
retailer and restore the confidence of banks and creditors.  Hideyuki
Sakai, a prominent Japanese bankruptcy lawyer who assumed the
lead of representing Mycal in its reorganization proceedings upon Mr.
Ejiri’s resignation, pursued the strategy of choosing a sponsor via
closed bidding.32  In order to acquire more funds to pay off creditors,
Sakai and Mycal’s legal team attempted to increase Mycal’s purchase
price by prohibiting participants in the bidding from comparing bids
with their competitors.33  Roughly twenty Japanese and international
retailers and investment funds submitted first round bids.  Although
the identities of the participants were kept secret, it was widely
speculated that the top candidates included American retail giant
Wal-Mart Stores and the Japanese supermarket chain Aeon.34  The
scale of what was up for grabs in the bidding was unprecedented in
the Japanese retail industry: at the time of the bidding Mycal directly
operated over 140 stores, the majority of which were opened in the
1990s, with total annual sales of approximately ¥800 billion ($6.67 bil-
31. Id.; see also Takehiko Sawaji & Hiroki Yoshida, Bankruptcy lawyers hold key to future
of failed firms, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 2001, at 23.
32. Maikaru, Shien Kigy  Wo Shiboru [Mycal Reduces Potential Supporters], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 3.
33. Maikaru, Saidai No Kanmon [Mycal’s Largest Hurdle], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct.
9, 2001, at 11 [hereinafter Mycal’s Largest Hurdle]; Maikaru Shien Kigy  K ho, Mazu 5 Sha
Zengo Ni [Mycal Takeover Candidates, First Reduced to Five Companies], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Oct. 12, 2001, at 11.  The bidding strategy employed by Mycal’s legal team marked a
clear break from past rehabilitation practices in Japan, which previously were the exclusive do-
main of Japanese banks; the Mycal bankruptcy can be seen as a turning point in this regard as
well.  Sawaji & Yoshida, supra note 31, at 23.
34. Maikaru Saiken: Supons , S sha Ni Shiboru [Mycal Restructuring: Potential Sponsors
Reduced to a Few Companies], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 13; Maikaru, Shien Kigy  Wo
Shiboru [Mycal Reduces Potential Supporters], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 3.
Immediately after it filed for reorganization, Mycal appealed to Wal-Mart to buy its most prof-
itable twenty or so stores, and proposed further business cooperation between the two retailers.
Having entered reorganization proceedings, Mycal felt it was a more attractive buy since it
would now be able to reduce its heavy interest-bearing debt burden, which had deterred Wal-
Mart earlier.  Maikaru, Uorum to Ni Shien Saiy sei [Mycal Again Requests Help from Wal-
Mart], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 17, 2001, at 13.
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lion).35  As a result, Japanese retailers were extremely concerned by
the prospect of a foreign competitor acquiring a secure footing in
their home market via the bidding.36
After the conclusion of the first round of bidding and the paring
down of buyout candidates to five on October 12, it appeared to ob-
servers that Aeon had the upper hand, although there was no public
confirmation from the involved parties.  Wal-Mart was reportedly
prepared to take over seventy to eighty of Mycal’s supermarket
stores.37  Aeon, however, was reportedly willing to acquire and re-
structure not only Mycal’s supermarkets, but also its Saty department
stores and Vivre clothing specialty shops. Additionally, Aeon indi-
cated its intention to preserve as many jobs of current Mycal employ-
ees as possible.38  As a condition for its offer, however, Aeon de-
manded that Mycal switch from Civil Rehabilitation to Corporate
Reorganization proceedings, and thereby regain the financial support
of its main lender for the restructuring process.39
These conditions made it very difficult for Mycal’s management
to accept Aeon’s offer.  Less than two weeks after the close of the
first round of bidding, the negotiations appeared to have fallen apart.
On October 24, Aeon announced that it was declining to take over
Mycal because of the complicated ownership status of Mycal’s stores,
the lack of transparency of past disputes among Mycal’s personnel,
and Mycal’s secrecy regarding the identity of the other takeover can-
didates.40  Wal-Mart was considered an even more awkward fit for
35. Mycal’s Largest Hurdle, supra note 33, at 11.
36. Id.; see also Ion, Maikaru Saiken Wo Shien: Kokunai Sandai S p  Jidai Ni [Aeon Sup-
ports Mycal’s Restructuring: Entering the Age of Three Giant Supermarket Chains], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 24, 2001, at 9 (suggesting that simply preventing Wal-Mart from estab-
lishing a foothold in Japan was a victory for Aeon).
37. Maikaru, Shien Kigy  Wo Shiboru [Mycal Reduces Potential Supporters], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 3.
38. Id.
39. Ny su Naruhodo: Maikaru Shien Kigy  Ni Ion, Hy ry  Habanda Hozen Kanrinin
[“You Don’t Say?” News: Aeon Supports Mycal, and the Trustee Who Prevented a Breakdown],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 4, 2001, at 3.  7-Eleven Japan operator Ito Yokado apparently
offered to take over only Mycal’s most profitable stores, but it was willing to do so under the
auspices of Civil Rehabilitation proceedings.  Id.
40. Most of the stores that Aeon was considering purchasing had been securitized by My-
cal, so their ownership status was complicated and the possibility existed that the final amount
Aeon would have to pay for the stores could increase.  Maikaru Ukezara K sh , Ion, Jitai Ts -
koku [Aeon Declines Mycal Takeover], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 25, 2001, at 3; Maikaru Ukezara
Sagashi Konton [Chaos in Finding Mycal Successor], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 26, 2001, at 13 (My-
cal’s representative Mr. Sakai expressed doubt that any potential, undisclosed bidder would in
fact drop out of the negotiations at such an early stage.).
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Mycal as the U.S. retailer’s stores are huge, one-floor warehouses in
suburban areas with relatively low property values.  Wal-Mart was
unlikely to find attractive the construction and location of Mycal’s
expensive, mostly multi-story stores built near Japan’s urban train sta-
tions.41  In addition, the negative impact of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the U.S. economy and consumer demand further
decreased the feasibility of Wal-Mart’s making a large-scale invest-
ment in the Japanese market.42  However, despite Aeon’s announce-
ment and widespread pessimism about Wal-Mart’s takeover, the ne-
gotiations continued.
Finally, on November 22, Aeon announced that it would indeed
acquire Mycal, but only on its long-held condition that the retailer
switch bankruptcy proceedings in order to gain the support of DKB.43
Mycal thus became the first company in Japanese history to switch
from Civil Rehabilitation to Corporate Reorganization proceedings.44
Despite going through three presidents in two weeks, alienating itself
from its main bank, and wasting over two months groping for new
lenders or potential takeover candidates in the process, Mycal’s man-
agement was forced to crawl back to DKB for financial support, and
to file under the bankruptcy proceedings it had initially tried to
avoid.45  As President Urano explained to reporters, “[W]e chose the
Civil Rehabilitation law in the hopes of quickly restructuring, but the
weakening of our stores progressed faster than we had expected.”46
Without the support of its main bank, Mycal was unable to maintain
41. Maikaru Ukezara Sagashi Konton [Chaos in Finding Mycal Successor], ASAHI
SHIMBUN, Oct. 26, 2001, at 13.
42. Id.
43. Ion, Maikaru Shien: K seih  Ni Henk , Dai-Ichi Kangin Mo Shikin Ky ryoku He
[Aeon to Takeover Mycal: Switch to Corporate Reorganization Law, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank to
Provide Financial Support], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 23, 2001, at 1; Aeon bails out Mycal
to grab top spot, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 26, 2001, at 2.
44. Aeon bails out Mycal to grab top spot, supra note 43, at 2.
45. haba Risutora Fukaketsu, Ion Ga Maikaru Shien [Aeon Supports Mycal, Extensive
Restructuring Inevitable], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 23, 2001, at 11; Aeon bails out Mycal to
grab top spot, supra note 43, at 2.
46. Aeon Supports Mycal, Extensive Restructuring Inevitable, supra note 45, at 11.  Over
forty of Mycal’s stores directly competed with Aeon’s, so it was widely speculated that despite
Mycal’s insistence on a takeover candidate to preserve as many stores and jobs as possible,
Aeon would make serious cutbacks.  Id.  At the time it filed for bankruptcy, Mycal’s manage-
ment assumed that roughly 100 of its 140 directly operated stores were profitable, but two
months later only ten to twenty of its stores were operating in the black, according to Aeon and
Ito Yokado.  Ion, Maikaru Saiken Wo Shien: Kokunai Sandai S p Jidai Ni [Aeon Supports My-
cal’s Restructuring: Entering the Age of Three Giant Supermarket Chains], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Nov. 24, 2001, at 9.
GROUSE-ARTICLE_FMT2.DOC 06/04/02  4:08 PM
2002] BANKS, BONDS AND RISK: THE MYCAL BANKRUPTCY 583
relations with its suppliers or complete a takeover deal with Aeon,
and in the end it was forced to choose between swallowing its pride or
closing its doors.47
III.  MYCAL AND THE CORPORATE BOND MARKET
A. The Impact of Mycal on Japan’s Corporate Bond Market
Of Mycal’s total debt burden, ¥350 billion (over $2.9 billion) was
in the form of outstanding straight bonds, making Mycal the largest
public debt default in Japanese history.48  Although the majority of
Mycal’s bonds were placed with institutional investors, over ¥90 bil-
lion ($750 million) worth of bonds were sold to over 35,000 individual
investors.49  Japanese credit rating agency R&I rated Mycal’s credit
BBB- at its February fiscal year-end, meaning repayment of its debt
was deemed sufficiently certain, and making the bonds investment
grade.50  In June, however, R&I lowered Mycal’s credit rating four
places to B+, several notches into junk bond status, indicating that its
ability to repay its debts was in serious doubt.51  Japan Credit Re-
search (JCR), another Japanese credit rating agency, did not lower its
rating of Mycal’s bonds from investment grade BBB to BB until
August 17, 2001, less than a month before Mycal’s bankruptcy.52
47. Although DKB’s inability to intervene and restructure Mycal before it filed for bank-
ruptcy is a sign of the main bank system’s decline due to the current financial weakness of
banks, the fact that Mycal had little hope of restructuring, even through formal insolvency pro-
ceedings, without its main bank’s support shows how deeply ingrained the main bank system is.
48. 3500 Oku En Saimu Furik : Maikaru Sai, K bosai De Saidai [350 Billion Yen Debt De-
fault, Mycal Bonds, Worst Public Debt Default Ever], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 15, 2001,
at 1.
49. Maikaru Sai Hoy  3 Man 5000 Nin Ch  [Over 35,000 Individual Investors Hold Mycal
Bonds], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 31, 2001, at 7.  Mycal issued ¥40 billion and ¥50 billion
worth of bonds aimed at individual investors in January and October 2000, respectively.  No-
mura Securities bore the brunt of the individual investor loss, as it sold over ¥60 billion worth of
Mycal’s bonds to over 23,000 of its investors.  Id.
50. Akira Ikeya, Government cracks down on bad loans, NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 24, 2001, at
1, 2; Shasai Kakuzuke Tsunoru Fushinkan [Corporate Debt Credit Ratings are Gathering Mis-
trust], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 23, 2001, at 9 (providing a useful graph showing Mycal’s declining
share price and slipping credit rating throughout 2000 and 2001).
51. Ikeya, supra note 50, at 2; Shasai Kakuzuke Tsunoru Fushinkan [Corporate Debt Credit
Ratings are Gathering Mistrust], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 23, 2001, at 9.
52. Fukus  Hikaku No Hitsuy  Mo [Comparing Multiple Ratings Necessary], ASAHI
SHIMBUN, Oct. 23, 2001, at 9 (quoting the chief analyst for JCR as saying, “[I]n our credit report
we wrote some very negative evaluations of Mycal, but it seems they weren’t effectively com-
municated to investors.  We’re looking into ways to change our ratings symbols so that investors
don’t just see A or BB, but understand our forecast for the company.”); Shasai Kakuzuke Tsu-
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Numerous Japanese companies were also caught holding Mycal’s
straight bonds, and were forced to write off their entire face value
(e.g., Shinkin Central Trust and Seino Transport, which held ¥6.1 bil-
lion ($50.8 million) and ¥3 billion ($25 million) worth of bonds re-
spectively).53  The Shutoken Shintoshi Tetsudo Company, a third sec-
tor, government-supported company charged with building a new
train line into Tokyo, purchased bonds guaranteed by Mycal and is-
sued by an affiliated company in 1997 and 1999 worth a total of ¥11
billion ($91.7 million).54  At the time of purchase, Mycal’s credit rating
was A.55  Meiji Dresdner Asset Management Company’s Money
Management Fund became the second money management fund ever
in Japan to fall below investors’ purchase prices, declining over ¥20
billion ($167 million) in value to ¥37 billion ($308 million) because it
held many Mycal bonds.56
Although Mycal’s bankruptcy caught many investors by surprise,
the warning signs were evident.  For example, in July 2001, one of
Mycal’s ¥100 face value bonds, due to mature in 2008, was trading at
¥33 ($0.28), a third of its face value.57  In theory, investors would still
have been able to recoup the full ¥100-value of the bond if they had
held on until maturity, but they were instead scrambling to sell be-
cause of Mycal’s credit rating downgrade to B+ from BBB- in June.58
The Mycal bankruptcy had an immediate effect on the entire
Japanese bond market and caused many companies with low credit
ratings to turn away from the increasingly expensive debt market and
back to bank financing.59  Although straight bond issuance for the
noru Fushinkan [Corporate Debt Credit Ratings Are Gathering Mistrust], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct.
23, 2001, at 9.
53. Maikaru Muke Saiken Hoyu Kigy , Aitsugi Sonshitsu Keijy  He [Numerous Companies
Holding Mycal Debt Reporting Losses], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 19, 2001, at 17; Maikaru
Muke Saiken H y  Kigy , Shinkin Ch kin 61 Oku En [Companies Holding Mycal Bonds,
Shinkin Ch kin 6.1 Billion Yen], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 20, 2001, at 17 (by September
19, the list of companies holding Mycal bonds grew to twenty-one).
54. Shasai Kakuzuke Tsunoru Fushinkan [Corporate Debt Credit Ratings Are Gathering
Mistrust], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 23, 2001, at 9.
55. Id.
56. Tsukamoto, supra note 3, at 12; Meiji Doresun  No MMF Ky gen: Maikaru Sai Ku-
miire Ganpon Ware [Sudden Decrease in Meiji Dresdner’s MMF: Included Mycal Debt, Below
Original Investment], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 3, 2001, at 7.
57. Dead, or just resting?, supra note 2, at 70; Ikeya, supra note 50, at 2.
58. Dead, or just resting?, supra note 2, at 70; Ikeya, supra note 50, at 2.
59. Kojin Muke Shasai Hakk  Zero: Maikaru Saimu Furik  Hibiku [No Corporate Debt
Issues Aimed at Individual Investors: Mycal’s Corporate Debt Default Resounds], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Oct. 18, 2001, at 7; Natsumi Tsukamoto, Activity in low-rated bonds anemic, NIKKEI
WKLY., Oct. 22, 2001, at 13.
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seven-month period ending in October, 2001 was expected to reach
¥5 trillion ($41.7 billion), topping the figure for the same period a
year earlier, only bonds rated double-A or higher were seeing any
significant investment inflow after September 14.60  A credit analyst at
Morgan Stanley Japan described the situation by commenting that “a
growing number of investors w[ould] not touch triple-B bonds.”61
After Mycal’s collapse on September 14, there was not a single
corporate debt issue aimed at individual investors until October 25,
when Sumitomo Real Estate issued a ¥10 billion ($83 million) bond,
which was also October’s first BBB-rated bond.62  Despite issuances
by over thirty-two companies of corporate bonds for individual inves-
tors totalling ¥866 billion ($7.2 billion) between April and September
2001, a 250% increase on the same period a year before, the six-week
period after Mycal’s bankruptcy saw no new activity.63  The market
froze, and until Sumitomo Real Estate’s issue, it looked as if October,
2001 would be the first month in thirteen without a single debt issue
aimed at individual investors.64
By mid-November it was clear that the bankruptcy would have a
lasting effect on the bond market.  The interest rate spread between
Japan’s national debt and issues rated between AAA and AA fell as
investors switched to safer bonds with higher credit ratings, while the
spread on BBB-rated bonds rose over 0.3% in less than two months
as investors dumped them.65  The trend showed no sign of slowing.
60. For example, a single A, six-year bond issued by Promise Co. with a coupon hike from
the company’s previous issue received a poor response.  Tsukamoto, supra note 59, at 13.
61. Id.
62. Kojin Muke Shasai Hyakuoku En: Maikaru No Hatango Hatsu [Ten Billion Yen Cor-
porate Debt Issuance Aimed at Individual Investors: First Since Mycal’s Bankruptcy], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 26, 2001, at 7.
63. Kojin Muke Shasai Hakk  Zero: Maikaru Saimu Furik  Hibiku [No Corporate Debt
Issues Aimed at Individual Investors: Mycal’s Corporate Debt Default Resounds], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Oct. 18, 2001, at 7 (containing a graph that shows the precipitous fall in corporate
debt issues for individual investors and also describing the negative impact on securities compa-
nies, which had been actively marketing such bonds because of their purported safety and rela-
tively high interest (around one percent) for Japan).
64. See id.
65. The vice president of Nikko Salomon Smith Barney Securities laments that no matter
how appropriately high interest may be relative to risk for bonds with lower credit ratings, in-
vestors still will not buy them.  Shasai T shi, Shiny  Risuku Ni Binkan [Corporate Bond Invest-
ment, Sensitive to Credit Risk], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 22, 2001, at 19.  Because investors
are not buying such bonds, the spread widens further, more investors dump them, and a vicious
cycle ensues.  Id.  Investors were also keeping their distance from bonds with lower credit rat-
ings because of the anticipated switch of accounting practices from book to market value, one of
Japan’s “Big Bang” financial reforms.  Id.  Many Japanese companies and banks were expected
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Companies with a BBB rating apparently found it cheaper to obtain
financing elsewhere: bonds rated BBB made up a third of all bond of-
ferings in September, but in the October–November two-month pe-
riod, they accounted for only one percent of bond issues.66  Several
well-known companies with good credit ratings of A or A-, including
Meiji Dairy Products and Sumitomo Denso, cancelled the issuance of
their bonds.67
The bankruptcy affected other debt issues as well.  By mid-
October, the value of subordinated debt issued by Japanese banks
had also weakened significantly.68  Yen-denominated debt rated be-
low investment grade and issued by foreign governments (Samurai
bonds) were also hit heavily: by October 17, the interest on Argen-
tina’s samurai bonds due to mature in 2005 was well over twenty per-
cent, almost a fifteen percent increase in less than three months.69
Pathetic cases of elderly investors who poured their retirement
savings into Mycal bonds, believing that they were safe from default,
abounded in the media.70  There was a proliferation of news articles
to take big hits as losses on stocks they had been hiding for years would finally have to be re-
ported.  Id.
66. T shika No Risuku Ishiki Takamaru [Investors’ Risk Awareness Heightens], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 13, 2001, at 11.  By mid-December, the spread on five-year bonds rated
BBB was 1.37%, while the spread on five-year bonds rated A was 0.52%, a 0.3% and 0.1–0.15%
rise from October’s levels, respectively, indicating the increased cost to debt financing.  Even
Japan’s traditionally strong steel and trading companies found the spread on their outstanding
bonds increase by as much as 2% from August’s levels.  Credit analysts predicted this environ-
ment would continue for at least half a year.  Id.
67. Shasai Hakk Miokuri Aitsugu, Shinguru A Kaku Sai Ni Mo Haky  [Corporate Bond
Issues Cancelled One After Another, Effect Spreading to Single A Bonds], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Dec. 13, 2001, at 11.
68. Gink  Retsugosai No Ninki Teimei [Popularity of Bank Subordinated Bonds Sinking],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 15.  The interest spread widened because investors
were uneasy about the ability of banks to set aside sufficient loss reserves to cover collapses
such as Mycal’s.  Id.  Of course, Japanese banks have many other problems independent of My-
cal.  See supra notes 1–2.  For example, with the Nikkei average dipping below 10,000, major
banks’ unrealized losses on securities have expanded to around ¥5 trillion ($41.7 billion).  See
Bank’s Bad-Loan Bumbling, supra note 1, at 19.  Since banks have long relied on unrealized
profits from their stock portfolios to cover non-performing loan losses, the plunging of the stock
market is making disposal of bad loans that much more difficult.  Some banks are even consid-
ering using legally mandated reserves, which have never been used before in Japan, to pay divi-
dends for the current term.  Id.
69. T shika No Senbetsu Senmei Ni [Selection By Investors Becoming Clear], NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 18, 2001, at 19.  The credit rating on Argentina’s debt had fallen to the
triple-C zone because of the country’s worsening financial situation, exacerbating the already
weak market conditions in Japan.  The interest rates on Brazil’s and Turkey’s samurai bonds
also increased.  Id.
70. Maikaru Hatan De Kojin Ni Higai [Individual Investors Hurt By Mycal Bankruptcy],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 30, 2001, at 11; Shasai Kakuzuke Tsunoru Fushinkan [Corporate
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advising casual investors on how to protect themselves, recommend-
ing that investors compare multiple debt ratings before purchasing
any corporate bond, and even detailing what to do in case the bond
you bought defaults.71
How could a system meant to appraise accurately the risk of in-
vestments have misled so many investors?  After the scale of the de-
fault and its effects became evident, the overriding sentiment was an-
ger and disbelief.  Confidence in the corporate debt market, in credit
rating agencies, in corporate trustees charged with looking after in-
vestors’ interests, and in companies issuing debt themselves, was se-
verely shaken.
IV.  MYCAL IN CONTEXT: JAPAN’S BOND MARKET
A. Background
Mycal’s default had such a large impact on Japanese investors
and the Japanese corporate debt market as a whole because of the
unsecured bond market’s relative youth and investors’ resultant un-
derdeveloped appreciation of risk.  There still exists in Japan a strong
tendency to view credit ratings as simply a black-and-white indicator
distinguishing between dangerous companies that are likely to default
(those rated below BBB) and safe companies that cannot, or will not
be allowed to, fail.72  In fact, credit rating agencies were not estab-
lished in Japan until the mid-1980s, before which a central committee
performed the credit-rating function.73  Mycal’s collapse was thus a
Debt Credit Ratings Are Gathering Mistrust], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 23, 2001, at 9 (revealing that
many elderly investors believe that bonds are safe from default so long as they are rated invest-
ment grade, and this false sense of security combined with the relatively high rate of interest
compared to bank accounts makes them popular investment tools).
71. Fukus  Hikaku No Hitsuy  Mo [Comparing Multiple Ratings Necessary], ASAHI
SHIMBUN, Oct. 23, 2001, at 9; Maikaru Hatan De Kojin Ni Higai [Individual Investors Hurt By
Mycal Bankruptcy], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 30, 2001, at 11.  The article includes a table
listing helpful information about major straight debt issuances to individual investors in 2001,
including the bonds’ credit ratings, and giving five tips to avoid failing in corporate bond in-
vestments: (1) pay attention to the amount of the issue and interest rate, (2) if you are uneasy
purchase a bond with a shorter maturity date, (3) keep close watch of the bond issuer in case its
credit rating falls, (4) pay attention to the issuer’s stock price, and (5) consider selling the bond
before it reaches maturity.
72. MARIKO KODAMA, SHASAI KAKUZUKE NO CHISHIKI, SHINY  RISUKU KANRI NO
JISSAI [KNOWLEDGE ABOUT BOND CREDIT RATINGS, THE ACTUAL MANAGEMENT OF
CREDIT RISK] 111 (1995).
73. See id. at 50–52.  Japanese credit rating agencies established in the 1980s include The
Japan Corporate Debt Research Institute, sponsored by the Nikkei Shimbun (1985), Japan In-
vestors Services (1985), and the Japan Credit Research Institute (1985).  See infra text accom-
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shock to Japanese investors and has resulted in widespread skepti-
cism about whether or not credit ratings accurately portray a com-
pany’s financial condition.74
It was not until the end of the bubble economy and the early
1990s that most Japanese investors began to become aware of the
credit risk inherent in corporate debt at all, in large part because the
number of Japanese companies issuing debt in this period greatly in-
creased.75  Between 1983 and 1993, the percentage of Japan’s listed
companies with bonds outstanding doubled.76  Changes in the types of
debt issued also kept pace with the rapid increase in sheer amount.  In
1989, at the peak of Japan’s bubble economy, domestic convertible
debt (kokunai tenkan shasai) and foreign bonds with warrants at-
tached (waranto sai) accounted for 77.9% of all bond issuances, total-
ling ¥15.9 trillion ($132.5 billion).  By 1997, however, these two cate-
gories of debt accounted for only 2.4% of Japanese bond issuances,
totaling only slightly over ¥270 billion ($2.25 billion).77  Taking their
place were straight bond offerings (both international and domestic),
which increased from ¥1.85 trillion ($15.4 billion), a 9% share of all
corporate bond issues, to ¥10.3 trillion ($85.8 billion), a 93.2% share
of the market, in the same period.78
As impressive as these figures are, however, the change from in-
ternational to domestic bond issues that Japan’s bond market under-
went is even more staggering.  During the 1980s, Japanese companies
issued their bonds primarily on international markets, so much so that
panying notes 89–98 (discussing the credit rating role of the kisaikai, or bond committee); see
also JYUNSUKE MATSUO, NIHON NO SHASAI SHIJY  [JAPAN’S CORPORATE DEBT MARKET]
75–76 (1999) (pressure from America played a role in the establishment of Japan’s domestic
credit rating agencies).
74. See, e.g., Maikaru Hatan De Kojin Ni Higai [Individual Investors Hurt By Mycal Bank-
ruptcy], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 30, 2001, at 11; Shasai Kakuzuke Tsunoru Fushinkan
[Corporate Debt Credit Ratings Are Gathering Mistrust], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 23, 2001, at 9;
Tsukamoto, supra note 3, at 12.
75. KODAMA, supra note 72, at 46–47.  Kodama also cites other related factors spurring
investor consciousness of risk, including a widening gap in the financial health of Japanese com-
panies resulting from increased capital investment risk due to the maturation of the Japanese
economy, the inability of Japanese main banks to continue bailing out troubled companies, and,
what I will focus on shortly, the sweeping reform of the corporate debt system itself in the early
1990s.  Id. at 47–50.  Reform of the corporate debt system made it possible for such a huge in-
crease in bond issuance to occur.
76. Id. at 47.  In 1983, 500 of Japan’s approximately 2,000 listed companies had bonds out-
standing, while in 1993 the number had grown to 1,300 of 2,600 listed companies.  Id.
77. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 3, 77–79 (explaining the current state of Japan’s corporate
debt market, as well as its reform and history since its inception, more clearly and in more detail
than any other resource I have found to date).
78. Id.
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in 1989 only ¥36 billion ($250 million) worth of straight bonds were
issued domestically (excluding bonds issued by electrical utilities),
equaling only one-twentieth the amount of foreign currency denomi-
nated international straight bonds issued the same year (over ¥770
billion, or $6.4 billion).79  To most Japanese businesses, the domestic
straight bond market may as well not have existed.80  By 1997, how-
ever, issues of Japanese domestic straight bonds (excluding electrical
utility issues) had expanded to ¥6.85 trillion ($57 billion), 190 times
their 1989 value, six times the value of all 1997 international straight
bond issues, and accounting for 62% of the entire Japanese bond
market.81
This data raises two questions: (1) why did Japanese companies
rely so heavily on bonds issued abroad in the 1980s, and (2) why did
they suddenly switch to domestic bond issues in the 1990s?  The an-
swer is that the Japanese corporate debt system was regulated sti-
flingly from the end of World War II until the early 1990s, and it was
not until that system underwent extensive reform in 1993 that a fa-
vorable environment for domestic unsecured debt financing finally
came into existence.82
B. Restrictions and Reform
Although an exhaustive survey of the Japanese corporate debt
system, its history, and evolution, is beyond the scope of this note, a
brief synopsis of its structure is in order before describing the sys-
tem’s recent reform.83  Japanese law governing the issuance of corpo-
rate debt is contained primarily in the Commercial Code, between
Articles 296 and 341-18.84  A separate law, the Secured Corporate
Bond Trustee Law (Tanpo Tsuki Shasai Shintakuh ), governs the is-
79. Id. at 3–4, 78.  This figure is more startling considering that ¥30 billion of the ¥36 billion
of domestic straight bond issues in 1989 were issued by NTT alone.  See id. at 78.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id.
82. See id at 4–5 (citing the precipitous fall in long term interest rates and stock prices as
other factors that contributed to the debt financing boom of the 1990s, but the primary reason
for the growth in domestic debt is the extensive reform of its legal framework).
83. See generally MATSUO, supra note 73, at 20–104 (discussing the history of the develop-
ment and reform of Japan’s corporate debt system from 1900 to the late 1990s); K SHASAI
HIKIUKE KY KAI [ASS’N FOR UNDERTAKING PUB. CORPORATE DEBT], K SHASAI SHIJY  NO
SHINTENKAI [THE NEW DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC CORPORATE DEBT MARKET] 16–19
(1996) [hereinafter K SHASAI] (providing a table describing the developments of the public
corporate debt market); FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, FINANCIAL POLITICS IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 138–50 (1989).
84. SH H , arts. 296–341-18.
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suance of secured corporate bonds and establishes laws concerning
collateral, trust arrangements, and trustee companies, which are al-
most always banks.85  Although these are the two most important laws
concerning corporate debt, a host of other specialized laws also affect
the corporate debt system.86
The pre-1993 Japanese corporate debt system contained many
onerous rules and mechanisms dating back to before World War II,
which effectively prevented Japanese companies from utilizing unse-
cured debt financing, and chose those companies that could issue
bonds at all.87  During the financial crisis of the late 1920s and early
1930s, many Japanese firms defaulted on their unsecured bonds,
leaving bondholders with nothing and contributing to the failure of
hundreds of banks.88  In response, the thirty or so largest bond-
underwriting banks, with the Ministry of Finance’s blessing, formed
the Bond Issue Arrangement Committee (kisaikai) (the Bond Com-
mittee) soon after the panic in order to collectively regulate future
bond issues.89  The core of the Bond Committee consisted of eight
major banks (The Industrial Bank of Japan, Mitsui Bank, Mitsubishi
Bank, Fuji Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Sanwa Bank, and DKB (then Dai-
Ichi Bank and the Japan Kangy  Bank)) that enforced a monopoly
under which only banks on the committee were permitted, under the
committee’s own rules, to serve as bond trustees (shasai bosh  no
jyutaku gaisha or jutaku gink ).90  The banks on the Bond Committee
also established the “collateral principle” (y tanpo gensoku),91 which
lasted well into the 1980s, requiring that corporate bonds may not be
issued without sufficient collateral.92  The four major securities com-
panies (Nikko Securities, Nomura Securities, Yamaichi Securities,
and Daiwa Securities) that were allowed to collect fees as bond un-
derwriters also had seats on the committee, but only the banks could
85. Tanp  tsuki shasai shintakuh  [Secured corporate bond trustee law], Law No. 52 of
1905.
86. These laws include the Corporate Debt Registration Law (Shasait  7 URNXK ), Law No.
11 of 1942; the Securities Exchange Law (Sh ken Torihikih ), Law No. 25 of 1948; and the Cor-
porate Reorganization Law (Kaisha k seih ), Law No. 172 of 1952.
87. KODAMA, supra note 72, at 49.
88. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 139.  The total number of banks shrunk from 1,283 in
1927 to 538 in 1932.  Id.
89. Id. at 140.  See generally MATSUO, supra note 73, at 54–56.
90. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 55; ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 140.
91. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 33–38.
92. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 36–38; ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 140.
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earn the fee for managing the collateral.93  The heavy restrictions
placed on corporate bonds by the Bond Committee caused a shift in
Japanese finance towards bank loans: in 1931 bonds accounted for
29.9% of corporate external funding and bank loans accounted for
13.6%, but by 1936 corporations issued almost no bonds at all, and
relied instead on bank loans for 40.6% of their financing.94
The Bond Committee also performed a credit rating function by
deciding which companies could issue bonds based on a matrix of
capital ratios, granting eligibility to a select few corporations.95  Be-
cause its standards were weighted heavily in favor of companies with
large amounts of capital or assets,96 from immediately after World
War II through the 1960s the Bond Committee preferentially directed
debt financing towards Japan’s burgeoning heavy industries and elec-
trical utility companies.97  The Bond Committee also decided the con-
ditions on which debt would be issued, such as the maturity date and
the issue amount, and it set interest rates for corporate debt in line
with the Bank of Japan’s framework behind national debt, regional
government debt, etc.98  The Bond Committee thus wielded immense
power as the sole entity that decided which companies could issue
bonds and on what terms.
Although one would imagine that the securities companies would
wield significant influence on the Bond Committee because of their
role as financial advisors to bond issuers and as the companies as-
suming the risk of being bond underwriters, it was the trustee banks
that dictated the Bond Committee’s policy.99  The reason for this was
that the banks were by and large the final destination for corporate
bonds.  In the 1960s the very same banks that were the bond trustees,
that set the issuance conditions and chose which companies could is-
sue bonds through the Bond Committee, purchased, on average,
63.4% of bonds issued, and sometimes as much as 80% depending on
the issue.100  As the principal investors, the banks determined the vol-
93. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 55; ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 140.
94. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 140–41.
95. Id. at 144.
96. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 54.
97. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 143–44 (noting that the Bond Committee survived
both World War II and the Occupation and that from 1947 until 1955, it operated under the
control of the Bank of Japan).
98. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 54–55.
99. Id. at 55.
100. Id. (suggesting that the banks’ influence as purchasers of the majority of bonds issued
in Japan caused many people to refer to bonds as simply another form of bank lending); see also
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ume of bonds that could be issued each month and ensured that the
amount was not enough to cut into their lending business.101  The un-
derwriter securities companies assumed relatively little risk because
the banks were the largest investors in bonds.  Furthermore, the un-
derwriter securities companies had very little advice for issuers be-
cause the banks set the credit ratings, interest rates, and other issue
conditions through the Bond Committee.102
Although the power of banks through the Bond Committee was
especially strong in the 1950s and 1960s, it began to decline from the
1970s onward as individual and institutional investors became a more
active force in the bond market,103 and as companies began to look for
financing alternatives to bank loans.104  Many of these companies be-
gan issuing bonds on the Euromarket, because in contrast to Japan’s
strict collateral rules and asset requirements enforced by the banks,
the Euromarket had no collateral requirement, and its best credit
ratings and cheapest financing went to firms with the strongest capital
base or low debt-equity ratios.105  In the early 1970s the Euromarket
accounted only for 1.7% of Japanese corporate financing, but by 1984
it accounted for 36.2% of the total.106
Masahiko Aoki et al., The Japanese Main Bank System: an Introductory Overview, in THE
JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 1, 13 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994) (providing a
table listing bank holdings of domestic corporate bonds from 1953–1991 and noting that Japa-
nese banks held more than fifty percent of outstanding domestic bonds through 1970).
101. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 145.
102. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 55 (stating that the securities companies were criticized by
the banks as simply receiving a “sleeping commission”).
103. Id. at 55–56.
104. As Japan’s economic growth slowed considerably after the post-oil-shock recession of
1975, companies found that too high a percentage of their corporate earnings went to interest
payments on bank loans and began reducing their dependence on them.  ROSENBLUTH, supra
note 83, at 147.
105. Id. at 148–49; see also John Y. Campbell & Yasushi Hamao, Changing Patterns of Cor-
porate Financing and the Main Bank System in Japan, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM,
supra note 100, at 325, 330.  The Ministry of Finance still enforced a matrix of capital and asset
requirements, mirroring domestic rules, for Japanese corporations issuing bonds in foreign cur-
rencies in the Euromarket.  Despite this, obtaining financing by issuing bonds abroad was still
cheaper because there was no collateral requirement (and no corresponding bond trustee ad-
ministration fees), no mandatory prospectus, and because of the numerous flexible rate instru-
ments and swaps that reduced interest rate and exchange rate risks.  ROSENBLUTH, supra note
83, at 149.
106. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 83, at 149.  Swiss Franc convertible bonds were the most
popular instrument of Euromarket fund raising, as many more companies met their issuance
qualifications under the Ministry of Finance’s rules.  In January 1986, 700 Japanese companies
were authorized to issue foreign currency convertible bonds in Europe, while only 80 were
authorized to issue unsecured straight Eurocurrency bonds.  Id.
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In February 1979, the liberalization of rules governing the issu-
ance of unsecured debt finally began to gather momentum when
Sears and Roebuck issued ¥20 billion ($167 million) worth of yen-
denominated unsecured bonds, the first unsecured bonds issued in
post-war Japan.107  The standards that were drafted to allow Sears and
Roebuck to issue its samurai bonds, however, were so strict that in
reality only two companies in all of Japan, Matsushita Electric and
Toyota Automotive, could meet them.108  In January 1983, the banks
relaxed the standards for issuing completely unsecured convertible
bonds (kanzen mutanpo tenkan shasai) for the first time, making it
possible for twenty-five Japanese companies to issue such bonds.  In
April 1984, the rules were further relaxed to allow ninety-seven com-
panies to issue unsecured convertible bonds and sixteen companies to
issue unsecured straight bonds (mutanpo   shasai).109  In January
1985, TDK became the first Japanese company since World War II to
issue a completely unsecured straight bond, and later that year the re-
strictions on debt issuance were relaxed again, increasing to 175 and
57 the number of companies that could issue unsecured convertible
bonds and unsecured straight bonds, respectively.110
Although standards dictating which companies could issue unse-
cured debt were relaxed throughout the mid-1980s, the system was
still slow to change, and as mentioned above, companies wishing to
issue straight bonds fled to foreign debt markets.  Despite relaxation
of issuance standards, the Japanese unsecured straight bond market
failed to develop because of the dominant position held by Japan’s
banks that served as corporate bond trustees (jyutaku gink ) under
the Secured Corporate Bond Trustee Law.111  The banks would have
lost their business and authority as trustees for collateral backed se-
cured debt, including the huge fees that they demanded for their trus-
tee services, if a general shift to unsecured debt occurred.112  In the
early 1980s, Japanese banks charged an average fee of ¥534 million
($4.45 million) for trustee services for a seven-year, seven percent in-
107. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 75 (as is seen throughout Japanese history in so many dif-
ferent areas, foreign pressure (gaiatsu) is often instrumental in promoting reform).
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also K SHASAI, supra note 83, at 18–19 (providing a timeline of the reforms).
110. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 75.
111. Id.  Article 2 of the Secured Corporate Bond Trustee Law requires a trustee for the
issuance of secured debt.  Tanpo Tsuki Shasai Shintakuh  [Secured corporate bond trustee law],
Law No. 52 of 1905, art. 2, para. 1.  Article 6 requires that in addition to trustee duties, the only
business that a trustee may be engaged in is banking.  Id. art. 6.
112. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 75.
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terest secured bond with a face value of ¥10 billion ($83 million),
compared to an average fee of ¥92 million ($760,000) for unsecured
bond issuances on the same conditions after the 1993 reforms.113
One reason that banks’ fees were so high was because of their
custom of buying back bonds in default and bearing the loss in place
of investors.114  Despite having no legal or contractual obligation to do
so, trustees would buy back the bonds in default at face value to pre-
serve trust and confidence in the corporate debt market, and then re-
cover the secured corporate debt directly in insolvency proceedings.115
The fees trustees charged were high enough to allow them to buy
back bonds in default at little or no cost.116  Because of their dual
authority as trustees and main banks, not to mention the high prices
they demanded, Japanese banks wielded huge influence over the de-
tails of any particular bond issue and prevented companies from is-
suing unsecured bonds despite the relaxation of issuance restric-
tions.117
To make matters worse, extremely rigid rules on the amount of
debt that could be issued by companies existed in the Commercial
Code itself.  Article 297 of the pre-1993 Commercial Code limited the
total amount of debt that could be issued to the lessor of either a
company’s “capital or cash reserves” or “net assets that exist accord-
113. Id. at 81 tbl.2-2 (comparing trustee service charges for Japanese banks).
114. Id. at 75.  Bonds were seen as a close hybrid of direct lending because (1) banks were
the main investors in bonds in the post-war growth period; (2) the bond issuer’s main bank was
usually the bond trustee or guarantor; and (3) the banks exerted great control over bond issues
through the Bond Committee.  Therefore, when a bank trustee bought back bonds in default, it
was mostly from other banks, and the bond buy back was usually done in coordination with
paying off loans to those banks as well.  As individual and institutional investors became more
active in the bond market in the 1970s and 1980s, however, the role of banks as the main pur-
chasers of bonds decreased, as did the necessity to buy back bonds in default from other banks.
See id. at 103–04.
The practice of main bank trustees repurchasing bonds in default can also be viewed as an
example of residual risk-bearing by the main bank, resulting from its role as the delegated moni-
toring and intervention agent in Japan’s capital markets.  See Paul Sheard, The Main Bank Sys-
tem and Corporate Monitoring in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399, 411–12 (1989).  From
1984 through 1991, over sixty percent of the bonds that Japanese banks guaranteed were for
their main bank clients, while firms turned more than seventy percent of the time to their main
bank for bond guarantees; the figures for main banks serving as bond trustees were similarly
high.  See Campbell & Hamao, supra note 105, at 345–49.  It follows, then, that the end of the
practice of trustees buying back bonds in default can also be interpreted as a signal of the de-
clining role of main banks as monitoring and intervention agents in today’s economically trou-
bled Japan.
115. See KODAMA, supra note 72, at 23.
116. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 75.
117. Id.
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ing to its final balance sheet,” and maintained this restriction since the
Meiji-era reforms in 1899.118  In other words, if a company wished to
issue new bonds, the total amount of its outstanding bonds, plus the
amount of new bonds it wanted to issue, could not exceed the lesser
of either its capital or cash reserves or net assets.119  This strict system
sought to protect the interests of bondholders by preventing compa-
nies from issuing debt in excess of their capital or assets.120
The system was liberalized somewhat in 1977, when the passage
of the Temporary Law on Corporate Debt Issuance Limits (Shasai
hakk  gendo zantei sochih )121 allowed regular corporations to issue
twice the amount of debt otherwise allowed in Article 297, but only if
the debt was secured corporate bonds, convertible bonds, or foreign
bonds.122  Throughout the 1980s, securities companies and general in-
dustry representatives pushed hard for the abolition of the Commer-
cial Code bond issuance limits and met resistance from the trustee
bank industry through a mouthpiece research committee composed of
scholars and Ministry of Legal Affairs bureaucrats.123
As a result of this rigid and expensive system and the glacial pro-
gress of reform, Japanese companies fled to foreign markets to obtain
financing en masse, as described earlier, primarily to issue straight
bonds.124  Realizing the gravity of the situation, the Corporate Debt
Special Committee of Japan’s Securities and Exchange Commission
118. See SH H , art. 297, para. 1, 2 (repealed 1993), reprinted in SATOSHI AIZAWA,
WAKARIYASUI KAISEI SH H  NO KAISETSU [EXPLANATION OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE
REFORM MADE EASY] 20–21, 327 (1993) (contrasting the language of the law before and after
the 1993 reform).
119. SH H , art. 297, para. 1, 2 (repealed 1993), reprinted in AIZAWA, supra note 118, at
327; see also MATSUO, supra note 73, at 84–88.
120. AIZAWA, supra note 118, at 327–28.
121. Shasai hakk  gendo zantei sochih  [Temporary law on corporate debt issuance limits],
Law No. 49 of 1977, available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_houritsu.nsf/html/houritsu/
08019770527049.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
122. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 85.  With the passage of the Special law concerning Corpo-
rate Debt Issuance Limits for General Electric Companies, electric companies were allowed to
issue up to six times the limitation in Article 297 starting in 1985.  Ippan denki jigy  kaisha no
shasai hakk  gendo ni kansuru tokureih  [Special law concerning corporate debt issuance limits
for general electric companies], Law No. 93 of 1985, available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_
houritsu.nsf/html/houritsu/10319851207093.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
123. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 87.  Industry’s criticisms of the Commercial Code issuance
limits included (1) it was illogical to place limits on the incurrence of debt via issuing bonds
when there are no limits to the debt that companies could amass by any other means; (2) basing
debt issuance limits solely on the value of a company’s assets ignored companies “going con-
cern” value and growth and profit-making potential; and (3) by abolishing the limits, the credit
risk of corporate bonds could be judged accurately by the market.  Id. at 87–88.
124. Id. at 76–80.
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released a report in late 1986 entitled “Concerning the Ideal Corpo-
rate Debt Market” (Shasai hakk  shij no arikata ni tsuite).125  As rea-
sons for the decline in the domestic bond market, the report cited
several factors, including: (1) compared to foreign markets, Japan has
far more legal and customary restrictions; (2) the versatility of bond
issuance conditions is insufficient; and (3) the collateral principle
(y tanpo gensoku) still persists.126  The report based its reform sugges-
tions on the principles of internationalization, liberalization, and pro-
tection of investors.  Its proposals included the reevaluation of the
collateral principle, improvement of the mechanism for bond issu-
ance, clarification of the functioning of the trustee system, promotion
of the diversification of corporate bonds, and relaxation or abolition
of the Commercial Code limits on bond issuance.127
In April 1990, reform began in earnest as the Diet passed the
Proposed Law Revising Part of the Commercial Code (    no
ichibu wo kaisei suru horitsuan), which went into effect in June of the
same year.128  The law removed the “capital or cash reserve” prong
from the Article 297 bond issuance limits, and doubled the amount of
convertible bonds or bonds with warrants attached that could be is-
sued.129
It was the passage of the 1993 reform, however, that truly opened
up Japan’s corporate debt market.  The Law Revising Part of the
Commercial Code, or simply the Commercial Code Reform (kaisei
sh h ), promulgated in June of 1993, not only abolished the long-
standing bond issuance limitations under Article 297, but also imple-
mented fundamental reform of the corporate bond trustee system,
without which the revitalization of Japan’s unsecured bond market
could not have occurred.130
125. Id. at 80 (citing CORPORATE DEBT SPECIAL COMM, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
CONCERNING THE IDEAL CORPORATE DEBT MARKET (1986) (Jap.)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 81–82.
128. Id. at 88; Sh h t  no ichibu wo kaisei suru horitsuan [Proposed law revising part of the
commercial code], Law No. 64 of 1990, available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_houritsu.nsf/
html/houritsu/11819900629064.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
129. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 88.  As the net assets of most companies far exceed the capi-
tal or cash reserves on hand, it was expected that this reform would increase the debt issuance
limits by an average of about 2.4 times.
130. Sh h t  no ichibu wo kaisei suru horitsu [Law revising part of the commercial code],
Law No. 62 of 1993, available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_houritsu.nsf/html/houritsu/
12619930614062.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2002); see also AIZAWA, supra note 118, at 11–17.
The Temporary Law on Corporate Debt Issuance Limits and sections of other current laws that
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The reform replaced the previous terminology for trustee (shasai
bosh  no itaku gaisha) with a new title, Corporate Bond Management
Company (shasai kanri gaisha).  It also more clearly established a
trustee’s functions as managing bonds after issuance, and not being
involved with negotiating the terms of the issuance.131  One of the
largest hindrances to the liberalization of the unsecured debt market
before the reform was the strong influence that trustee banks had
over setting the terms of bond issues and the high trustee service fees
that resulted.132  This was due in part to the vagueness in phrasing of
the old Japanese provision describing the duties of a trustee, which
had been interpreted to allow banks to expand their trustee duties
beyond just the management of bonds and protecting bondholders’
interests.133  The new law therefore limited the business of trustees to
managing bonds after issuance and created extremely important room
for securities companies to finally step in and fill the financial advisor
role of deciding the conditions for a bond issue.134  Examples of func-
tions that had been performed by trustee banks before the reform,
and that now became the work of underwriters, included the running
of extensive checks on the issuer to confirm that it qualified under the
Ministry of Finance guidelines for debt issuance and setting the finan-
cial conditions for the bond (capital maintenance ratios, restrictive
covenants, etc.).135
In addition, the reform expanded the pool of companies that can
serve as trustees to include not only banks and trust companies, which
had been permitted before, but also companies that have received a
trustee license under the Secured Corporate Bond Trustee Law.136
This change was intended to lower trustees’ high fees, as it was ex-
pected that increasingly more companies would receive trustee li-
censes.137
The reform succeeded in greatly reducing trustee service charges.
In the early 1980s, a seven-year unsecured bond with a face value of
limited debt issuance were also abolished.  Id. at 11.  See generally MATSUO, supra note 73, at
95–104.
131. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 95–97.
132. AIZAWA, supra note 118, at 12.
133. Id.
134. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 95–97; AIZAWA, supra note 118, at 13.
135. MATSUO, supra note 73, 97–98.
136. SH H , art. 297-2; see also MATSUO, supra note 73, at 95; AIZAWA, supra note 118, at
14.
137. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 95–97; AIZAWA, supra note 118, at 14.
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¥10 billion ($83 million) cost ¥318 million ($2,650,000).138  After the
reforms the fee for the same bond had fallen to ¥43 million
($358,000).139  Thus, the reforms were extremely effective in breaking
the trustee banks’ requirement that all bonds be secured, in lowering
the cost of issuing bonds, and thereby spurring the revitalization of
the domestic bond market.
C. Risk Appreciation
In light of this sudden liberalization of the Japanese bond mar-
ket, and the resulting boom in debt financing discussed above, it is lit-
tle wonder that the general appreciation of risk on the part of the av-
erage Japanese investor is poorly developed.  Between 1945 and 1995,
there were only twenty cases of default on corporate bonds in Japan,
and only nine of them occurred before 1980.140  Far more remarkable
than this small number of defaults, however, is the fact that until
1984, when Riccar Company defaulted on a small amount of Swiss
Franc denominated unsecured convertible bonds, Japanese investors
never had to bear the loss on their principal and interest when their
bonds defaulted.141  There was neither a guarantor with a contractual
obligation to compensate investors for the lost principal and interest,
nor a trustee willing to voluntarily buy back Riccar’s bonds at face
value and bear the concomitant loss itself in order to preserve inves-
tors’ trust.142  Thus, a precedent of investors bearing the loss of a bond
default was set, but it was not until Mycal’s collapse in 2001 that a de-
fault caused heavy financial losses to individuals.143
138. MATSUO, supra note 73, at 101, 240–45.  This figure included ¥175 million of fees for
trustee services in relation to collateral—in the early 1980s no completely unsecured debt was
issued.
139. Id. at 101–02.
140. KODAMA, supra note 72, at 19.
141. Id. at 22; see also Kaigai CB Mo Sh kan Katto: Rikka Wagi Shinsei, Hamon Hirogaru
[International Convertible Bond Payback Cut: Impact of Riccar’s Composition Filing Spreads],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, July 25, 1984, at 16 (Riccar’s default was the first time that the re-
payment of outstanding convertible bonds incurred a cut in principal and interest) [hereinafter
Kaigai CB].
142. KODAMA, supra note 72, at 24.  Riccar’s conditions for repayment of the bonds were
(1) exemption from paying interest; (2) a forty percent cut in principal; and (3) a deferred pay-
ment period for the remaining sixty percent of principal.  See Kaigai CB, supra note 141, at 16.
Banks that served as either trustee or guarantor for a company’s bond issue were usually its
main bank.  See discussion supra note 114.
143. Riccar’s total debt burden at the time it filed for bankruptcy was ¥82.6 billion ($688
million), less than one twentieth of Mycal’s, although at the time Riccar was Japan’s fourth larg-
est post-war bankruptcy.  Hy men Kuroji, Daidokoro “Hi No Kuruma:” Wagi Shinsei No Rikka
[Profits on the Outside, But a Fire in the Kitchen: Riccar Files for Composition], NIHON KEIZAI
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But it is less the actual financial loss suffered by investors in My-
cal, and rather the circumstances under which that loss occurred, that
has many people questioning the functioning of Japan’s corporate
bond market.  Mycal’s unexpected bankruptcy has raised serious
doubts about whether corporate bond trustees are taking their duties
as protectors of investor assets seriously.  Seven banks with out-
standing loans to the failed retailer, including Mycal’s main lender
DKB, serve as trustees for Mycal bonds, and there is suspicion that
these banks were trying to collect on the collateral backing their loans
beginning several days before the company filed for court protec-
tion.144  In particular, DKB is suspected of violating its trustee duties
to bondholders when it extended ¥50 billion ($417 million) of loans to
Mycal in August, 2001.145  Mycal sold uncollateralized parent firm as-
sets to one of its subsidiaries and then offered these assets as collat-
eral for the August loan, in an apparent attempt to circumvent an
equal and ratable clause attached to its corporate bonds.146
DKB’s status as a creditor-trustee creates a conflict of interest
from which bondholders in the United States are protected by the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and in particular by its provisions pro-
hibiting conflicts of interest for indenture trustees.147  Injured bond-
holders also have a federal cause of action under the Trust Indenture
Act against a bond trustee for the breach of indenture terms man-
dated by the Act.148  Section 310(b)(10), introduced in the Trust In-
SHIMBUN, July 24, 1984, at 9.  Only ¥100 million ($833,000) worth of Riccar’s ill-fated unsecured
convertible bonds had still not been converted to stock at the time of default.  Kaigai CB, supra
note 141, at 16.
144. Tsukamoto, supra note 3, at 12.  These banks appear to have a conflict of interest as it
is their duty as bond trustees to secure the assets of the bond issuer for repayment to bondhold-
ers in the case of default, while it is also in their interest to foreclose on the collateral backing
their own secured loans to the issuer.  Id.
145. Id.; Suemura, supra note 3, at 83.
146. Tsukamoto, supra note 3, at 12; see also Yameru Kinyu #3: Shasai Shijy  No Kyok
[Suffering Finances, Part 3: the Corporate Bond Market’s Fabrications], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Nov. 10, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter The Corporate Bond Market’s Fabrications].  An
equal and ratable clause, a provision routinely included in indentures that establish the rights of
bondholders, requires that in the event an issuer offers collateral for any new loan or indebted-
ness, it must post an equal and ratable amount of collateral for the outstanding bonds.  By put-
ting the assets up at its subsidiary, Mycal apparently hoped to claim that it did not actually give
collateral for the loan, its subsidiary did, and therefore it need not post new collateral for its
outstanding bonds.  This is a dubious argument.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(1)–(10) (1999).  A conflict of interest also exists and disqualifies a
trustee if, for example, it acts as a trustee under other indentures of the same obligor (§
77jjj(b)(1)), or if the trustee or any of its executive directors is an underwriter for the obligor (§
77jjj(b)(2)).
148. See Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980).
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denture Reform Act of 1990, prohibits trustees from being or be-
coming creditors of the obligor if the obligor falls into default on its
bonds.149  Upon default on the bonds, the trustee has ninety days to
eliminate the conflicting interest, and if it is not cured during this time
the trustee must resign.150  The original section in the Trust Indenture
Act dealing with creditor-trustees did not prohibit creditor-trustee
relationships outright but instead prohibited the trustee from retain-
ing for its own benefit any payments it received in its capacity as a
creditor of the obligor within four months before a default in pay-
ment occurred.151  Under Section 310(b)(10) of the Trust Indenture
Act, DKB would clearly have a conflict of interest as a creditor-
trustee of Mycal, and its actions in securing collateral for a fresh loan
only a month before Mycal filed for bankruptcy, much less trying to
collect on such collateral, would be grounds for bondholders to sue
under the indenture.152
Japanese law seems to lead to the same conclusion.  According to
the second paragraph of Article 311-2 of the Commercial Code, if a
trustee receives collateral from a bond issuer to secure a debt or loan
to the issuer, or if the issuer pays off any debt owed to the trustee,
and within three months of providing the collateral or extinguishing
the debt the issuer fails to make a payment of principal or interest on
its bonds (defaults) or stops making its payments as they become due
(becomes insolvent), then the trustee is responsible for the payment
of damages to the bondholders.153  Furthermore, under the first para-
graph of Article 311-2, the trustee is also liable for the payment of
damages to bondholders if it violates any other provision of the
Commercial Code,154 which includes the duty of diligence of a good
149. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(10); Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550, 104
Stat. 2721 (1990); Efrat Lev, The Indenture Trustee: Does it Really Protect Bondholders?, 8 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 47, 98–100 (1999) (emphasizing that by setting a post-default conflict of
interest standard, the Trust Indenture Act does not adequately protect the rights of bondhold-
ers, as a trustee with a conflict of interest may well transfer wealth from bondholders before de-
fault actually occurs).
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b); Lev, supra note 149, at 99.
151. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 311, 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(11) (amended 1990); see Lev,
supra note 149, at 98.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(10).
153. SH H , art. 311-2, para. 2 (the trustee is not responsible for payment of damages to
bondholders if it can prove that it did not receive collateral from the issuer or have the issuer
extinguish its debt).  Note the similarity between this article of the Commercial Code and the
U.S. Trust Indenture Act’s provision on creditor-trustees before Section 310(b)(10) was added
in 1990.
154. SH H , art. 311-2, para. 1.
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custodian (zenry  naru kanrisha no ch i gimu) and the duty of fair-
ness and loyalty (kohei katsu seijitsu na shasai no kanri gimu).155  Un-
der paragraph 2 of Article 311-2, then, DKB should be liable to My-
cal’s bondholders for receiving collateral within three months before
Mycal went bankrupt and defaulted.  Even if the fact that the collat-
eral was posted through a Mycal subsidiary exculpates DKB under
paragraph 2, it should be liable under paragraph 1 of Article 311-2 for
violating both its duty of diligence of a good custodian and its duty of
fairness and loyalty.  The outcome, however, remains to be seen; as of
yet no bondholders have filed suit against DKB for violating its trus-
tee duties.
Why have no bondholders filed suit yet?  As previously ex-
plained, in Japan bond trustees are usually the bond issuers’ main
banks.156  So long as main bank trustees bought back all the bonds in
default, as they did until the mid-1980s, there was never any question
of conflict of interest, because the bondholders’ investment was pro-
tected.  Now that the practice of buying back bonds in default has
ended due to the weakened position of Japanese banks, actions that
may once have been lauded as part of the main bank’s interventionist
and risk-bearing role, such as DKB’s extension of fresh credit to My-
cal, can now only be seen as defrauding bondholders.  But perhaps
because of the long existence of the main bank system, Mycal’s bond-
holders don’t seem to be in any rush to hold DKB accountable.
To make matters worse, the purpose for issuing the ¥350 billion
of outstanding bonds on which Mycal later defaulted was largely to
pay back the retailer’s loans to its main lender, DKB.157  Although at
first glance it appeared that DKB was forced to take huge losses by
stepping in and assuming other banks’ loans when Mycal was in trou-
ble, that loss was significantly reduced thanks to the funds raised via
Mycal’s bonds.158  The pay back of these loans probably occurred be-
fore the three-month window provided in Article 311-2, paragraph 2,
however, and therefore is unlikely to be the source of a suit against
the trustee.
Mycal’s responsibility is heavy as well.  Despite being in clearly
desperate shape for many months leading up to its bankruptcy filing,
Mycal continued to increase its debt burden and dispose of its assets
155. These duties of a trustee are codified in SH H , art. 297-3, para. 1, 2.  The imposition of
liability for violation of these duties is codified in SH H , art. 311-2, para. 1.
156. See supra discussion at note 114.
157. Suemura, supra note 3, at 83.
158. Id.
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to buy time, eventually leaving little for creditors (except its trustee
banks) or bondholders when it finally went bust.159  Japanese compa-
nies, their management practices and predilection to avoid bank-
ruptcy no matter what the cost to creditors and bondholders, as well
as the banks that fund them, must share the blame for this chain of
events.160  Considering the staggering numbers of bad loans on the
books of Japan’s banks, though, it is a near certainty that more com-
panies in the near future will collapse in Mycal’s spectacular fashion,
after having wasted years and billions of dollars worth of financing to
delay the inevitable.161  But the bitter experience of Mycal’s collapse
and the many bankruptcies to come are also sure to force Japan’s
immature bond market to grow up in a hurry and to heighten inves-
tors’ appreciation of risk.
V.  CONCLUSION
Japanese investors’ appreciation, and perhaps temporary over-
appreciation, of the risks of corporate bonds in the wake of Mycal’s
bankruptcy may be seen as an overall positive development.  The fact
that many Japanese investors considered investment grade bonds to
be as safe as savings accounts, with higher interest rates to boot, re-
veals just how naïve their understanding of the nature of corporate
debt was (or, more cynically, it may demonstrate just how deceptively
Japanese securities firms have been marketing corporate bonds).162
As Mariko Kodama, Manager at the Mikuni Offices, a Japanese
credit rating agency, says, “[I]t is impossible to distinguish from the
beginning whether or not a company will fail.  Corporate bond in-
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Aoki Kensetsu Saiseih  Shinsei He: Fusai S gaku 3721 Oku En [Aoki Construction
to File for Civil Rehabilitation: Total Debt 372.1 Billion Yen], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (evening
ed.), Dec. 6, 2001, at 1; Dead, or just resting?, supra note 2, at 70 (detailing Asahi bank’s efforts
to keep Aoki in the official “in need of monitoring” category and out of the “in danger of bank-
ruptcy” category); Face value The salvage man, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2001, at 74 (detailing the
financial condition of Daiei (now Japan’s second largest supermarket chain after Aeon), which
is substantially worse than Mycal’s).  According to Teikoku Databank, Ltd., in 2000 there were
19,071 bankruptcies in Japan, up 23.4% from 1999, carrying a total debt burden of nearly ¥24
trillion ($200 billion), a 77% increase on the previous year.  Teikoku Databank, Ltd., Zenkoku
Kigy  Tosan Sh kei, 2000 [National corporate bankruptcy statistics, 2000], available at http://
www.tdb.co.jp/tosan/syukei/00nen.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2002).
162. See Corporate Debt Credit Ratings Are Gathering Mistrust, supra note 70.  The over
20,000 investors who poured their retirement savings into Mycal bonds in exchange for their two
to three percent yearly interest had no understanding that they were assuming a bankruptcy
risk.  See The Corporate Bond Market’s Fabrications, supra note 146, at 1.
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vestment must begin on the condition that bankruptcies are inevita-
ble.”163
But it is exactly that understanding that has been slow to develop
since Japan’s sweeping bond market reform of 1993.  Observers of
Japan’s economy have warned that one of its most dangerous struc-
tural flaws is the widely-believed myth that listed or large companies
do not fail.164  Inevitably a main bank will step in before bankruptcy is
unavoidable.  The corollary to this principle in Japan’s pre-1993 cor-
porate debt market was that companies “chosen” to issue debt were
not allowed to fail.165  The result of this philosophy is that inefficient
companies that should fail are allowed to exist.  These colossal debt-
ors continue to consume scarce bank financing when it could be more
efficiently used by other companies and spur growth in other indus-
tries; their assets continue to be used inefficiently when they should
be disposed of and recycled back into the economy.  Despite clearly
being insolvent, large Japanese companies that should fail refuse to
give up and are supported by their main banks well beyond rational
limits, thereby decreasing the payout to bondholders when such com-
panies finally do go under.166  In short, Japanese banks have numerous
patients on life support, and until they start pulling plugs when it is
clear there is no more hope, it is doubtful Japan’s economy will im-
prove or that bondholders’ rights will be respected.
Mycal’s bankruptcy should be viewed as a turning point in the
deconstruction of the myth that large Japanese companies cannot fail,
not only in relation to Japan’s main banks that are finally being
forced to clear their books of bad loans, but also in regard to how in-
dividual Japanese investors approach the corporate debt market.167
163. The Corporate Bond Market’s Fabrications, supra note 146, at 1.  Kodama’s quote in
this article echoes her admonitions to Japanese investors in her book cited frequently in this
note.  See generally KODAMA, supra note 72.
164. Suemura, supra note 3, at 83.
165. KODAMA, supra note 72, at 49.
166. See, e.g., Suemura, supra note 3, at 83.
167. Statistics seem to show that the myth is dying: the first nine months of 2001 saw the
third-largest number of bankruptcies (14,174) recorded in the January–September period in
postwar Japanese history, and nearly a quarter of the companies collapsing are long-established
firms that have been in business for thirty or more years.  See Big firms going under in alarming
numbers, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 5, 2001, at 4 (“Financial institutions, having supported long-
established companies out of consideration for their influence on regional economies, can no
longer comply with requests for additional lending from those with no prospect of rehabilita-
tion.”).  But see The Corporate Bond Market’s Fabrications, supra note 146, at 1 (asserting that
investors still do not appreciate the bankruptcy risk inherent in corporate bonds, even after My-
cal, and that they make bond investment decisions based more on how well-known the company
is as opposed to its credit risk).
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“If issuers of corporate debt, investors, securities companies, trustees,
banks, accountants and credit rating agencies all function under rules
based on the principle that ‘bankruptcies happen,’ then even if there
is a huge default, at least it will not result in utter panic.”168  If Japan
does eventually manage to extract itself from its current economic
abyss, no doubt the demise of Mycal and the wake-up call concerning
risk it gave to bond investors, as well as its role in revealing the im-
portance of the principle that “bankruptcies happen,” will be viewed
as an important reason why.
Eric Grouse
168. Suemura, supra note 3, at 83.
